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JURISDICTION 
I urisdiction to 1 lear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as 
amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
appellants had breached their dul\ to defend title conveyed by them and awarding damages 
i i « e-* .*w are: 
.1 Did the trial court err in finding that D. Stoddard Judd and Valene A. J udd (the 
"Judds") had breached their duty to defend title where there was insufficient factual basis 
for UKi' " "*: " !r • , ; » -' '* > 
by the Supreme ( Pint where the findinus are clcarh erroi rou,- ek v. Plani 
Devcujpiuent Corp., . .x K, .. JUJK < "*•» Kuiw..- -
Procedure The Supreme Couii ma\ gli the facts in an equity ease, jinlining
 : 
Simonds, 636 P,2d 4 ^ . 1^ 0 (Utah 19M , The finding must be reviewed in - la:!.* ;n^t 
' -^ - .. , . i ^ Irrigation Lo. v. Logan Rivei & blacksmith Fork In. v.u„ 
7SU P.2d 1241. 1244 (\ "tah 19SQ). The trial court's findings were Kised -.ip« i - 'offered 
CVKIUKV itjtli ,i ih,i .. . . lony and should i ece ive no more dcurciu;^ .;,J.. -i.;.en a 
decision N rendered upon stipulated facts. Estate of Wolf in go - \ vYolnnger. "^ 93 F.2d 393 
( i , u i l i A . J 
1 :"-"-" mi.ill i m i l l I ' I I , iii'i ,i I in, in I In in mi! lliiHiV i n (ii i i i i i i i i i i ' l l i . i l l n d i l ' i liiiiill l u i ' i k l i r d 
t h e i r d u t y t o d z fend title where they had engaged ii :t discovery, researched ?hc law and 
facts,, and appear ed at tt ial prepai ed to defend title which tl ley conveyed < ;. ^preme 
1 
Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness without according them 
deference. Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). This is true even if the 
conclusions of law are denominated findings of fact. State By and Through Div. of Con-
sumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Judds believe that this is a matter of first impression for this court and that, there-
fore, there are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings 
The Judds conveyed by warranty deed a parcel of property in conjunction with a 
Real Estate Exchange Agreement to Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. The property was 
subsequently conveyed to W.E.S./MHP Joint Venture, who subsequently conveyed to 
Waterside Associates who constructed an apartment complex on the property. (Appellees 
are referred to herein collectively as "Waterside".) In 1985, the Cahoon & Maxfield Irriga-
tion Company filed an action against Waterside claiming a fee interest in the property. 
Waterside joined Judds as third-party defendants to defend title to the property. 
In 1987, Judds commenced an action against Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. and 
other parties, including Waterside, for non-payment of amounts due under the Real Estate 
Exchange Agreement and foreclosure on the property. This action was subsequently 
consolidated with the 1985 lawsuit. 
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During the course of the lawsuit, Judds were represented by three different sets of 
counsel. Upon entry of appearance by Judds' present counsel, Judds engaged in discovery 
jirnl h*sr;in III ill prrpar.ilinn Im ilrh nsr nl 11 u• lillr ulnim h (In •' i o i n n n l \s In ml iifMiivil 
they were approached with vagu • M\ ;» u discuss settlement. Having researched the facts 
ami 1111 iLii'i I in mi ill ill wui I'unuiuul lli.il 11 ic lillt lllii,,'i Mtmnnl was ileh ii\i!illr IIIIIIINI I \p-
ressed a preference for defending their title at trial. I "rior to trial, Waterside participated 
in several settlement negotiations which did not include Judds As trial neared, Waterside 
cnfcrnl mlo ,i M/ltlnii in! iipjcriiinil willi < \\\\mm iV MaxficM v'villniiiil resolving the legal 
issues. 
!
 . . 5 appeared, read) to dotcm! MIL IJ I ill IBecuuse ull line 
settlement with Cahoon & Maxfield, the trial court determined that the only issues to be 
resolved were whether Judds were liable to Waterside f^r b m c h of warranty or breach of 
1 - :oi ill ::! make the dete rmi-
natiun based t : \ >cd evidence )•* :r;ci. *\ ,n subsequently, without entering 
specific findings of fact in suppoi 1: of its k gal conclusion, found that the J i ldds 1 lad 
breached their duty to defend and awarded costs and attorney fees to Waterside. 
Statement of F acts 
1. On August 17, 1983, the Judds conveyed by warranty deed the subject parcel of 
property to Western Enviro Systems, Inc (Record, 001 22; Defendant's Exhibit 1) 
2 , T h f * i nun "i|iil||( {\tp subsequcMilh nm^n ' i l 1 i VVVMIirni (Ttvint-Systi ins Inr lo 
W.E.S. /"" Mi *V !oint Venture by warranty deei! Defendant's Exhibit 2) 
l'i Mn / uiguiNill , I l'K\ I'ahoon -.;.,:u.. Ill i ligation t i)inpiiii\ aniiiJiiieiiuiJ llluis 
action against Waterside alleging, among other things, a fee simple interest in a 33 foot 
wide strip of land aligned with its canal across the property. (Record, 00001) 
4. On November 10, 1986, Appellees, as Third-Party Plaintiffs, filed a complaint 
against Judds, as Third-Party Defendants, to require them to defend title to the property. 
(Record, 00106; Record, 00870 (Trial Transcript), page 9, lines 23-24) 
5. Judds were represented by two law firms prior to entry of appearance by Judds' 
present counsel on August 18, 1988 (Record, 00426). 
6. The Judds instructed their present counsel to examine the records of the ditch 
company to evaluate the fee claim (Record, 00870, page 20, line 17). Appellant's counsel 
immediately initiated discovery (E.g., Notice of Deposition at Record, 00437). 
7. Judds' counsel researched the facts, making available to counsel, including coun-
sel for Waterside, a letter from counsel for Cahoon & Maxfield disavowing fee simple 
claim to the property (Record, 00870, page 18, lines 9-11; Plaintiffs exhibit 4). 
8. Judds' counsel also researched the law surrounding the fee simple claim, includ-
ing evaluation of an attorney's opinion letter secured by the Judds in November of 1986 
(Record 00870, page 17, lines 17-18). 
9. Waterside negotiated on several occasions with Cahoon & Maxfield, the latest 
beginning ten days before trial (Record, 00870, page 5, lines 15-19). The Judds were not 
present at or invited to these negotiations. 
10. The Saturday before trial, Waterside again negotiated with Cahoon & Maxfield, 
entering into a settlement agreement (Record, 00870, page 7, lines 11 et seq.; page 8, lines 
1-2). The Judds were not represented at the settlement negotiations. 
11. The settlement was entered into even though Waterside acknowledged valid 
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defenses to the fee claim (Record, 00870, page 7, lines 2-3). 
12. On the day of trial, the Judds appeared, ready to defend their title. They were 
advised that Waterside had settled with Cahoon & Maxfield. The trial court determined 
the only remaining issue to be that related to breach of duty to defend. The Judds and 
Waterside stipulated that the trial court could take evidence by proffer for purposes of 
resolving the remaining issue. 
13. Waterside proffered testimony that Judds had failed and refused to accept the 
defense of the title (Record, 00870, page 8, lines 17-19). 
14. Judds proffered testimony showing they were actively involved in defense of the 
title (Record, 00870, page 20, line 17; Record, 00870, page 18, lines 9-11; Record 00870, 
page 17, lines 17-18). 
15. The trial court entered, among others, the following findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law: 
a. Finding of Fact No. 4: When sued by Cahoon, Waterside made demand 
upon the Judds to defend title. The Judds' defense consisted merely of appearing 
at trial announcing that they were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee simple 
ownership. The record shows that the Judds effectively refused to defend the title 
throughout the lengthy period of time that this litigation pended. (Record, 00809, 
emphasis in original.) 
b. Finding of Fact No. 9: Prior to trial, Waterside and Cahoon reached a 
stipulated resolution of their claims, wherein Waterside would take certain actions 
to insure action [sic] to the ditch for Cahoon, but would not lose fee simple title to 
the area in question. The cost to third-party plaintiffs to settle Cahoon's claims was 
$51,000 ($36,000 to widen the canal; $15,000 cash settlement). The Judds refused 
offers to participate in the negotiations that lead [sic] to the settlement between 
Waterside and Cahoon. (Record, 00910, emphasis in original.) 
c. Conclusion of Law No. 5: The duty to defend and warrant the title in the 
Warranty Deed that the Judds gave requires that the Judds do more than appear at 
the time of trial, with knowledge that Waterside had settled, and boldly announce 
that they were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. (Record, 
5 
00811.) 
d. Conclusion of Law No. 6: The Judds have breached their duty to defend 
and warrant the title. Third-party plaintiffs are entitled to be indemnified for the 
cost they incurred in defending title in the amount of $78,500 ($36,000 to widen 
canal; $15,000 cash settlement; $27,500 in attorneys fees), both the costs related to 
effecting the settlement and to attorneys fees. (Record, 0811 to 00812.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's findings of fact related to Judds5 duty to defend title are not sup-
ported by the record. Because this is an equity case and the testimony was proffered 
pursuant to stipulation of the parties, this court may weigh the evidence and need give no 
deference to those findings. Based upon the record, the trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous and should be set aside. 
The trial court erroneously interpreted the facts, concluding that Judds had done 
nothing but show up at trial ready to defend the title. It also incorrectly concluded that 
Judds had breached their warranty of title. Both of these conclusions are erroneous as a 
matter of law. 
Judds did everything reasonably required of them to defend the title which they 
conveyed and warranted. If there was a breach due to earlier, incorrect legal advice, that 
breach was cured by the subsequent active participation of Judds' present counsel in de-
fense of the title. Further, as a matter of law, Judds have a right to defend the title they 
warranted, even if the case goes to trial, and were deprived of that right. That deprivation 
amounts to a waiver of Waterside's claims of breach of duty to defend. Under any evalua-
tion of the law and the facts, the trial court's conclusion that Judds breached their duty to 
defend is erroneous and should be set aside. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE JUDDS 
HAD REFUSED TO DEFEND TITLE AND REFUSED TO 
PARTICIPATE IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IS 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. LACKING THE 
NECESSARY EVIDENTIARY BASIS THOSE FINDINGS 
ARE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The only indications that the Judds may have failed to defend title are contained in 
the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint (Record, 00106) and the testimony proffered 
pursuant to stipulation of the parties (Record, 00870, page 8, lines 17-19). By contrast, the 
evidence shows that Judds, through their present counsel, were actively involved in defense 
of the title. Judds examined the records of the irrigation company to evaluate the fee 
claim (Record, 00870, page 20, line 17), engaged in discovery (E.g., Notice of Deposition, 
Record, 00437 and Record, 00586), researched facts and made evidence available to other 
counsel (Record 00870, page 18, lines 9-11; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4), researched the law (E.g., 
Record 00870, page 17, lines 17-18), and appeared at trial ready to defend title. 
There is no evidence in the record that Judds were ever offered a change to partici-
pate in settlement negotiations. Nor is there evidence that they refused to participate in 
those negotiations. 
Because the proffered testimony was made upon stipulation by the parties, this court 
need not accord the factual findings of the trial court the normal deference and need only 
sustain those findings if convinced of their correctness. Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger, 
793 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah App. 1990). Since this is a case in equity, this court is permitted 
to weigh the facts. Crimmins v. Simonds. 636 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah 1981). Comparing the 
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evidence of record, it is apparent that there is more evidence in support of the proposition 
that Judds were defending title than in support of the claim that they breached their duty 
to defend. 
Even viewed in a light most favorable to the findings, those findings are clearly 
erroneous. There is no evidentiary support for the portion of Finding No. 9 that the Judds 
refused to participate in the settlement negotiations. The record clearly does not support 
Finding No. 4 that Judds refused to defend the title throughout the litigation. Because the 
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, they should be set aside by this court. 
POINT II 
JUDDS DID NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BREACH 
THEIR WARRANTY OF TITLE OR DUTY TO DEFEND. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION SHOULD, THERE-
FORE, BE SET ASIDE. 
A. THE TRIAL COURTS ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE FACTS 
GAVE RISE TO AN INCORRECT CONCLUSION OF LAW. 
The trial court's statement in Conclusion No.5 is probably a correct statement of the 
law: 
The duty to defend and warrant the title in the Warranty 
Deed that the Judds gave requires that the Judds do more than 
appear at the time of trial, with knowledge that Waterside had 
settled, and boldly announce that they were ready to defeat 
Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. (Record, 00811.) 
However, there is no evidence in the record which would provide a factual basis for this 
conclusion as applied to the Judds. As discussed in Point I, Judds did much more than 
appear at trial and "boldly announce that they were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee 
simple ownership." They investigated the facts, researched the law, participated in discov-
8 
ery, prepared their defense and appeared at trial ready to defend the fee claim. 
Further, there is nothing in the record showing that Judds had knowledge of the 
settlement. Even if they did know of the settlement, it would not have any bearing on the 
fact that they had prepared and were ready to defend the title. 
While the trial court's statement of the law would appear to be correct, the factual 
basis for applying this conclusion to Judds does not exist. The application of this conclu-
sion to Judds is, therefore, incorrect as a matter of law. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT JUDDS HAD BREACHED 
THEIR WARRANTY OF TITLE IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The trial court's Conclusion No. 6 holds that Judds breached their duty to warrant 
title. "As a general rule, there is no breach of a covenant of warranty or for quiet enjoy-
ment until there is an eviction under paramount title." 7 Thompson, Real Property § 3196, 
p. 353 (emphasis added). This breach occurs only when it is conclusively shown that the 
grantor did not own the property he conveyed by the warranty deed description. Creason 
v. Peterson. 470 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1970).1 
Because the original claim by Cahoon & Maxfield was settled, no determination was 
ever made regarding the claim to fee title. There was no eviction under paramount title, 
actual or constructive, nor was it conclusively shown that Judds did not own the property 
conveyed by their warranty deed. They did not, therefore, breach their warranty of title 
and the trial court's conclusion that they did is clearly erroneous. 
Citing 6 Powell, Real Property, § 905 (1969). 
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C. JUDDS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR DAY IN COURT TO DEFEND THE 
TITLE WHICH THEY WARRANTED. WATERSIDE'S SETTLEMENT WITH-
OUT JUDDS' CONSENT, AFTER THEY HAD PREPARED THEIR DEFENSE, 
WAIVED JUDDS DUTY TO DEFEND THE TITLE. 
The object of notifying a grantor of a claim to title is "to give the covenantor a fair 
opportunity to defend the title he has warranted, to the end that he may defeat an unjust 
claim of superior title. . ." 61 A.L.R. 10, 173. In addition to the duty to defend title, a 
grantor has a right to defend that belongs to him and not to the grantee or subsequent 
grantees. Mellor v. Chamberlain, 672 P.2d 610, 613 (Wash. 1983). Included in the cove-
nants statutorily imposed upon one who executes a warranty deed is the warranty to defend 
the title "against all lawful claims whatsoever." Utah Code § 57-1-12 (1953) (emphasis 
added). Nowhere is there a duty imposed upon a grantor to settle a claim of fee title. 
Judds are entitled to defend the title which they conveyed and, if they choose to do 
so, defend it at trial. They had researched the facts and the law and were prepared to 
defend title. They, and they alone, were at risk for an adverse ruling on the fee simple 
claim. 
Waterside, though nominally at risk for an adverse ruling, would, as a matter of law, 
have been indemnified by Judds through their warranty of title. Waterside was not, in 
actuality, at risk. Even so, Waterside engaged in negotiations for and entered into a settle-
ment of the fee simple claim without the consent of Judds. The effect of this settlement is 
that it deprived Judds of their right to defend the title which they warranted. Having so 
deprived Judds of their right to defend, the settlement by Waterside acts as a waiver of 
their claim against Judds for breach of the duty to defend. In other words, if Waterside 
wished to claim a breach of the duty to defend, they should not have deprived Judds of 
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their right to defeat, at trial, Cahoon & Maxfield's claim to superior title. 
D. IF, AT SOME POINT, THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE DUTY TO DE-
FEND, THAT BREACH WAS CURED BY THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION 
OF JUDDS' PRESENT COUNSEL IN DEFENSE OF THE TITLE. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact fail to specify the acts or omissions of Judds which 
may have amounted to breach of their duty to defend. It is possible, as evidenced by the 
argument in Point I, that the court looked at the early actions in this case and failed to 
recognize the active participation of Judds' present counsel in defense of the title. If, in 
fact, the finding of breach was based upon actions or inactions under the guidance of 
former counsel, the direct involvement of Judds' present counsel in defense of the title 
should act as a cure for the earlier breach. 
The facts indicating the active participation of Judds' present counsel should, as a 
matter of law, lead to the conclusion that there was no breach of the duty to defend or, at 
least, that any prior breach was cured. 
E. JUDDS TOOK ALL ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE TITLE WHICH 
THEY CONVEYED, THEREBY DISCHARGING THEIR DUTY TO DEFEND. 
The duty to defend is statutory and applies only to the interest actually conveyed by 
the warranty deed. Utah Code § 57-1-2 (1953); Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866, 868 
(Utah 1979); Burton v. United States, 507 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1973). 
In this action, Judds had no duty to defend claims related to easements or other 
non-fee issues. The covenant to defend against these items was expressly excluded by the 
language of the warranty deed. The only issue Judds had a duty to defend against was 
Cahoon & Maxfield's claim to a fee interest. The duty to defend does not extend to pro-
11 
tecting any other of Waterside's interest nor to indemnification for attorney fees expended 
in protecting those interests. 
Judds were able and ready to defend against the fee claim. They had made reason-
able investigation into the facts and law related to the claim. They appeared with counsel 
at the time designated for trial and stated their readiness to proceed. 
Judds were convinced from the facts and the law that Cahoon & Maxfield's fee 
claim was without merit. Waterside characterizes this position as a denial of Judd's duty to 
defend. On the contrary, it is a manifestation of their belief in a carefully reached legal 
conclusion and of their readiness to show at trial that the claim was without merit. 
That Waterside was not comfortable with Judds' posture does not minimize the fact 
that they were ready, willing and able to defend the title, all that they were required by 
statute to do. Waterside was not entitled to undertake that defense so long as Judds were 
defending title. Merely because Waterside retained and paid counsel to defend the title 
and protect any other interests it had does not prove that Judds failed or refused to defend 
the title. 
Waterside reached a settlement with Cahoon & Maxfield, precluding a hearing of 
the fee claim on its merits. This eliminated the claim without determining its validity. By 
doing this, Waterside prevented Judds from consummating their defense of the title. 
Having blocked the opportunity to defeat the fee claim, Waterside should not be permitted 
to claim that Judds failed to defend the title. 
Judds did all that was reasonably necessary to evaluate the facts and the law and 
were prepared to defeat Cahoon & Maxfield's fee claims at trial. This clearly discharges 
their duty to defend the title which they conveyed. The trial court's Conclusion No. 6 is 
12 
clearly erroneous and should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the facts nor the law support the trial court's holding that Judds breached 
their duty to defend. Since the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are clearly erro-
neous, the judgment of the trial court should be set aside and judgment entered in favor of 
Judds. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1991. 
Reed Brown 
Attorney for Appellants and Third-
Party Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the 18th day of June, 1991, I caused four copies of this 
Appellant's Brief to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Mark O. Van Wagoner 
Christopher J. Condie 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated January 9, 1991. 
2. Judgment, dated January 9, 1991. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner (3323) 
Christopher J. Condie (5267) 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1036 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAHOON & MAXFIELD IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a 
limited partnership; 
MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE, 
Defendants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE 
A Judd, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
REVISED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C 85-5168 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
This case was heard in a non-jury trial before the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hansen, District Court Judge, on November 
14, 1989. Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company was not present, 
its claims having been settled prior to trial. Waterside 
0G8C6 
Associates, Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. and W.E.S./MHP 
Venture (hereinafter collectively referred to as "third-party 
plaintiffs") were present and represented by their counsel of 
record, Mark 0. Van Wagoner, Esq. and Christopher J. Condie, Esq. 
D. Stoddard Judd and Valene A. Judd were present and represented 
by their counsel of record, C. Reed Brown, Esq. Western Enviro-
Systems, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel of 
record, James L. Warlauiaont, Esq. 
The matter proceeded by way of proffer of testimony by 
all parties through their attorneys, and exhibits were marked and 
received into evidence. Prior to trial, counsel submitted legal 
memoranda to the Court. Following the proffer of testimony, 
further legal argument dealing directly with the evidence was 
received by the Court. Additional post-trial memoranda were 
submitted to the Court at its request. 
After having received the pleadings on file herein, 
having received the evidence and exhibits of the parties, having 
considered the arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
2 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. ("Western Enviro") 
purchased a piece of property (the "Property") from D. Stoddard 
Judd and Valene A. Judd (the "Judds") by Warranty Deed on August 
17, 1983. The Warranty Deed given to Western Enviro by the Judds 
contained the customary requirement to "defend and warrant" title 
to the buyer. The Warranty Deed contained the exceptions as 
stated below; 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Restrictions and 
Rights of Way, currently of record and/or 
enforceable in law and equity, and general 
property taxes for the year 1983 and 
thereafter, in any and all water rights of 
record. 
2. By way of Quit Claim Deeds, Western Enviro and R. 
Bruce McMullin conveyed their interest in the Property to 
W.E.S./MHP Joint Venture. On June 28, 1985, W.E.S./MHP Joint 
Venture transferred the property to Waterside Associates 
("Waterside") by Warranty Deed. 
3. On September 27, 1985, Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation 
Company ("Cahoon") filed suit against third-party plaintiffs 
claiming, among other things, a fee simple interest to a ditch 
area that cut through Waterside's development. 
3 
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4. When sued by Cahoon, Waterside made demand upon the 
Judds to defend the title. The Judds' defense consisted merely 
of appearing at trial announcing that they were ready to defeat 
Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. The record shows that 
the Judds effectively refused to defend the title throughout the 
lengthy period of time that this litigation pended. 
5. In September of 1986 the Judds began a non judicial 
foreclosure proceeding against third party plaintiffs. Following 
a hearing on August 6, 1987, the Court entered a preliminary 
injunction against the Judds enjoining them from proceeding with 
their foreclosure action. 
6. Third-party defendants have deposited $125,000 as 
bond for the preliminary injunction, which are currently being 
held in West One Bank account number 0100230194. 
7. On September 30, 1987, the Judds filed a Complaint 
against the third party plaintiffs, McMullin and W.E.S., civil 
no. C87-6497. That case was consolidated with C85-5168. 
8. After consideration of Cahoon's claims and the 
potential effects of an adverse ruling on the entire project, 
Waterside determined that the risk of an adverse finding 
4 
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warranted some attempt at settlement and compromise with Cahoon. 
i 
I 
9. Prior to trial, Waterside and Cahoon reached a \ 
stipulated resolution of their claims, wherein Waterside would J 
take certain actions to insure action to the ditch for Cahoon, , 
but would not lose fee simple title to the area in question. The i 
cost to third-party plaintiffs to settle Cahoonfs claims was I 
$51,000 ($36,000 to widen the canal; $15,000 cash settlement). | 
i 
The Judds refused offers to participate in the negotiations that i 
lead to the settlement between Waterside and Cahoon. | 
i 
10. Third-party plaintiffs incurred [wore required to | 
pay] $27,500 in attorneys fees to defend title to the property. I 
No evidence was presented at trial adverse to the scope, cost or 
reasonableness of the attorneys fees incurred by third-party ' 
i 
plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW | 
1. The Judds1 duty to defend title to the property 
which they conveyed bv Warranty Deed arises from a covenant that 
runs with the land. Waterside has standing to assert its claim 
against the Judds under the Warranty Deed given to Waterside's 
predecessor in 1983. 
5 
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2. Cahoon's claims of fee simple against the title are ! 
not excluded under the Warranty Deed. Excluded only are I 
easements, restrictions and rights of way, no of which 
constitutes a claim of fee simple ownership. J 
3. The amount of land claimed by Cahoon would have 
adversely impacted the complex built by Waterside. Third-party 
plaintiffs were justified in settling Cahoon's claims against ] 
them. 
4. The scope and cost of Waterside's work to effect a 
settlement which precludes a potential adverse verdict was both | 
reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
5. The duty to defend and warrant the title in the ! 
Warranty Deed that the Judds gave requires that the Judds do more , 
I 
than appear at the time of trial, with knowledge that Waterside j 
had settled, and boldly announce that they were ready to defeat 
Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. 
6. The Judds have breached their duty to defend and 
warrant the title. Third-party plaintiffs are entitled to be 
indemnified for the cost they incurred in defending title in the 
amount of $78,500 ($36,000 to widen canal; $15,000 cash 
6 I 
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settlement; $27,500 in attorneys fees), both the costs relating 
to effecting the settlement and to attorneys fees. 
7. All claims asserted in C87-6497 are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
8. Third-party plaintiffs are entitled to the release 
of the bond for the preliminary injunction from West One Bank 
account number 0100230194 to their counsel of record. 
DATED this 
R. HANSON 
/Third Judicial District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
DepuiyCterk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REVISED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
to be mailed this )^S( day of December, 1990, by depositing the 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to: 
E. J. Skeen, Esq. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P. 0. BOX 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
C. Reed Brown, P.C. 
3450 South Highland Drive 
Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
James L. Warlaumont, Esq. 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Mark O. Van Wagoner (3323) 
Christopher J. Condie (5267) 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1036 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAHOON & MAXFIELD IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a 
limited partnership; 
MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE, 
Defendants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs, 
D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE 
A Judd, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
»-u-cii-%a\ 
civil No^r^c^iSj^ie^) 
V c 87 :r6497 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
The Court, having reviewed the proffered evidence, 
all legal memoranda and trial exhibits and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the 
following Judgment: 
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1. That plaintiff Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation 
Company's claims against defendants, Waterside Associates, 
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., and W.E.S/MHP Venture be 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the stipulation between 
the parties thereto; 
2. That third-party plaintiffs Waterside 
Associates, Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., and W.E.S./MHP 
Venture are awarded judgment against third-party defendants, 
D. Stoddard Judd and Valene A. Judd the sum of seventy eight 
thousand five hundred dollars ($78,500) ($36,000 to widen the 
canal; $15,000 cash settlement; $27,500 in attorneys fees), 
with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum as 
provided by law and their costs of action. 
3. That all claims raised by D. Stoddard and 
Valene A. Judd in case no. C87-6497 are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
4. That the money currently held in West One Bank 
account number 0100230194, be released to third-party 
plaintiffs and their counsel. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be mailed this *2*^~ day 
of June, 1990, by depositing the same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, to: 
E. J. Skeen, Esq. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
C. Reed Brown, P.C. 
3450 South Highland Drive 
Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
James L. Warlaumont, Esq. 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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